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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Natalie Munroe filed this First Amendment 
retaliation action against Defendants Central Bucks School 
District (“School District”), School District Superintendent N. 
Robert Laws, and Central Bucks East High School (“CB 
East”) Principal Abram Lucabaugh.  The School District fired 
Munroe, an English teacher at CB East, after her blog—in 
which she made a number of derogatory comments about her 
own students—was discovered.  She appeals from the order 
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania granting the Defendants’ summary judgment 
motion.  We agree with the District Court that, pursuant to the 
Pickering balancing test, Munroe’s speech did not rise to the 
level of constitutionally protected expression.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm. 
 
I. 
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   In 2006, Munroe was hired by the School District and 
assigned to teach English at CB East in Doylestown, 
Pennsylvania.  Her performance evaluations indicated that 
she was generally considered to be an effective and 
competent teacher.  For example, an October 2006 review 
praised her abilities and work habits.  In June 2008, 
Lucabaugh wrote a letter of recommendation in support of 
Munroe’s application for admission to a graduate program.  
He described Munroe as a “woman of utmost integrity, 
character, and intelligence,” “a consummate educator with a 
sparkling future,” and “a woman whom I respect both 
personally and professionally.”  (A175.)  The School District 
granted Munroe tenure in March 2010.   
 In August 2009, Munroe began a blog entitled Where 
are we going, and why are we in this handbasket?  Blogging 
under the name “Natalie M,” she did not expressly identify 
either where she worked or lived, the name of the school 
where she taught, or the names of her students.  According to 
Munroe, her blog was meant to be viewed by friends that she 
had asked to subscribe.  She did not intend for it to be read by 
the public at large.  For most of the blog’s history, there were 
no more than nine subscribed readers, including Munroe 
herself and her husband.  However, no password was required 
to access the blog. 
 
 Munroe wrote a total of eighty-four blog posts 
between August 2009 and November 2010, “most of which 
had nothing to do with her school or work.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief at 6 (citing A208-A254, A412-A452).)  Intended as a 
vehicle to keep in touch with friends, Munroe mostly 
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addressed personal matters like her food and film preferences, 
her children, and her regular yoga classes.  On a number of 
occasions, she wrote about her co-workers, the School 
District administration, her students, and their parents. 
 
In what the District Court called “one memorable 
passage,” Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 34 F. Supp. 3d 
532, 538 (E.D. Pa. 2014), Munroe explained that she was 
entering grades, discussed the grading process, and, finally, 
offered some comments she would like to see added to the so-
called “canned” comment list used to fill out students’ report 
cards.  At the top of this January 20, 2010 blog post, there 
was a depiction of a school bus with a “Short Bus” sign and 
the following heading:  “I DON’T CARE IF YOU LICK 
THE WINDOWS, TAKE THE SPECIAL BUS OR 
OCCASSIONALLY PEE ON YOURSELF … YOU 
HANG IN THERE SUNSHINE, YOU’RE FRIGGIN 
SPECIAL.”  (A245).  Munroe then stated the following: 
 
I’m being a renegade right now, living on the 
edge and, um, blogging AT work. 
 
However, as I’m blogging about work stuff, I 
give myself a free pass of conscience.   
 
I’m in the process of entering grades, and also 
need to enter comments for the grades.  I used 
to take a lot of time with this procedure, 
choosing just the right comment(s) for my 
students.  If I put a negative one, I’d also put a 
positive one to temper it.  (When I was in 
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school, I hated when I got the same 2 or 3 
comments from my teachers.  It felt so 
insincere.) 
 
(For the record, my computer froze and had to 
be shut down at work; when I rebooted, I didn’t 
bother signing back on to finish this as other 
things to do came up.  At present, then, I’m not 
being a renegade at all, as I’m writing this at my 
kitchen table.) 
 
Anyway, as I was saying, when I was first 
teaching, I put a lot of time and effort into the 
comments because I felt it was a great way to 
communicate the students’ efforts.  Then it got 
to be a complete pain in the ass, just one more 
thing standing between me and being done the 
report cards, and suddenly I realized why I’d 
always gotten the same comments from my 
teachers:  they didn’t want to do them any more 
than I do.  (I refuse to believe the alternative 
reason that I’ll explore momentarily.) 
 
Also, as the kids get worse and worse, I find 
that the canned comments don’t accurately 
express my true sentiments about them.  So now 
I pretty much choose “Cooperative in Class” for 
every kid (or, in some instances, will speak in 
other codes.  For instance, if they talk a lot, I’ll 
put “is easily distracted” or “talks persistently”; 
if it’s a kid that has no personality, I’ll put 
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“ability to work independently”).  For some 
kids, though my scornful feelings reach such 
fever pitch that I have a hard time even putting 
“cooperative in class” and have, sadly, had 
some kids for which none of the comments fit.  
(Again, this was NOT me.  It couldn’t have 
been.  I was a delight!!) 
 
Thus, for this blog, I will list the comments I’d 
like to see added to the canned comment list, as 
an accurate reflection of what we really want to 
say to these parents.  Here they are, in no 
particular order: 
 
 Concerned your kid is automaton, as she just 
sits there emotionless for an entire 90 minutes, 
staring into the abyss, never volunteering to 
speak or do anything. 
 Seems smarter than she actually is. 
 Has a massive chip on her shoulder. 
 Too smart for her own good and refuses to play 
the school ‘game’ such that she’ll never live up 
to her true potential here. 
 Has no business being in Honors. 
 A complete and utter jerk in all ways.  Although 
academically ok, your child has no other 
redeeming qualities. 
 Lazy. 
 Shy isn’t cute in 11th grade; it’s annoying.  
Must learn to advocate for himself instead of 
having Mommy do it. 
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 One of the few students I can abide this 
semester! 
 Two words come to mind:  brown AND nose. 
 Dunderhead. 
 Complainer. 
 Gimme an A.I.R.H.E.A.D.  What’s that spell?  
Your kid! 
 There is such a thing as too loud in oral 
presentations.  We shouldn’t need earplugs. 
 Att-i-tude! 
 Nowhere near as good as her sibling.  Are you 
sure they’re related? 
 I won’t even remember her name next semester 
if I see her in the hall. 
 Asked too many questions and took too long to 
ask them.  The bell means it’s time to leave! 
 Has no business being in Academic. 
 Rat-like. 
 Lazy asshole. 
 Just as bad as his sibling.  Don’t you know how 
to raise kids? 
 Sneaking, complaining, jerkoff. 
 Frightfully dim. 
 Dresses like a street walker. 
 Whiny, simpering grade-grubber with an 
unrealistically high perception of own ability 
level. 
 One of the most annoying students I’ve had the 
displeasure of being locked in a room with for 
an extended time. 
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 Rude, belligerent, argumentative fuck. 
 Tactless. 
 Weirdest kid I’ve ever met. 
 Am concerned that your kid is going to come in 
one day and open fire on the school.  (Wish I 
was kidding.) 
 I didn’t realize one person could have this many 
problems. 
 Your daughter is royalty.  (The Queen of 
Drama) 
 Liar and cheater. 
 Unable to think for himself. 
 I hear the trash company is hiring . . .  
 Utterly loathsome in all imaginable ways. 
 I called out sick a couple of days just to avoid 
your son. 
 There’s no other way to say this:  I hate your 
kid. 
 
These comments, I think, would serve me well 
when filling out the cards.  Only, I don’t think 
parents want to hear these truths.   
 
  Thus the old adage ... if you don’t have 
anything nice to say ...  
   
  ... say “cooperative in class.” 
 
(A245-A246.) 
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 On April 3, 2010, Munroe blogged about all of the 
“Things From This Day That Bothered Me.”  These “Things” 
were almost all work-related: 
 
Things From This Day That Bothered Me 
 
 1.  The fact that it was 85 degrees in my 
classroom because the district insists on 
controlling the temperature from central admin 
and won’t turn on the AC until May 15th, even 
though people are sweltering NOW. 
 
2.  The fact that I called home about an 
obnoxious kid in class last week before break 
and his mom said they told him to “knock it 
off” (the obnoxious behavior), yet the FIRST 
thing he said to me when he saw me today was, 
“Yeah, Ms. M. I give you credit for tryin’ to 
ruin my weekend.  But the boys rallied up and 
had a banger anyway!”  Clearly, the talk with 
his mom was quite effective. 
 
3.  The fact that several students in 3rd block 
did a lame job on their easy assignment today. 
 
4.  The fact that the jerk who was out 3 days 
around our last major assessment because his 
family took him on trip to Puerto Rico and then 
emailed me all of this nonsense about how he 
shouldn’t have to take the test on time because 
he was “excused” for those days, was out again 
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today (the date of another assessment) because 
his family took him to the effing Master’s golf 
shit over Easter break.  Can someone please tell 
me why Thursday-Wednesday wasn’t enough 
time off to do what had to be done such that he 
could come back today when he KNEW there 
was an assessment???  It’s good that people 
value school so much—wait, no, they don’t. 
 
5.  The new chick who seems to be on or near 
my elliptical all the damn time. 
 
(A213.)  In this same blog post, Munroe listed “Artists Who 
Annoy the Crap Outta Me and Who I Must Turn Off as Soon 
as I Hear the Opening Bars to Their Songs, But Who Are 
Regarded as ‘Talent’ by Some People” (i.e., Alicia Keys, 
Beyonce and Destiny’s Child, and Miley Cyrus) as well as 
“Things I Liked About This Day.”  (Id.)  None of the “Things 
I Liked About This Day” were related to her job or her 
students.  Rather, these “Things” focused mostly on her 
daughter. 
 
 Discussing recent disciplinary issues and other 
problems (for instance, she had to deal with a student and his 
mother complaining about a test score), Munroe asked on 
October 27, 2009: 
 
Kids!  I don’t know what’s wrong with these 
kids today!  Kids!  Who can understand 
anything they say?  They are disobedient, 
disrespectful oafs.  Noisy, crazy, sloppy, lazy 
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LOAFERS (and while we’re on the subject) 
Kids!  You can talk and talk till your face is 
blue.  Kids!  But they still do just what they 
want to do.  Why can’t they be like we were?  
(Perfect in every way!!!)  What’s the matter 
with kids today?????  My students are out of 
control.  They are rude, disengaged, lazy 
whiners.  They curse, discuss drugs, talk back, 
argue for grades, complain about everything, 
fancy themselves entitled to whatever they 
desire, and are just generally annoying. . . .  
   
(A440.)1 
 
 In another blog post dated January 11, 2010, Munroe 
explained why she believed that “this new-aged soft-on-
crime/bribery and overindulgence is probably the reason that 
kids are so horrible today.”  (A249.)  According to Munroe, 
“teenagers are complete asses” who have no respect for 
adults, for authority, or for teachers.  (Id.)  “Parents won’t 
allow anyone but themselves to discipline their kids, but 
THEY don’t do any disciplining either.”  (Id.)  Teenagers 
then talk back in school and “think it’s appropriate to try to 
go into my desk to retrieve a hackey-sack that was 
confiscated during use in class.”  (Id.)  Comparing how 
parents treat their children today with how she was raised, 
Munroe complained that parents were “breeding a disgusting 
brood of insolent, unappreciative, selfish brats.”  (A250.)  
                                                 
1 According to her deposition testimony, Munroe was 
quoting a song from Bye Bye Birdie.   
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Noting that “it’s paper grading time again,” Munroe observed 
in an April 17, 2010 blog post that “these times are getting 
worse and worse.”  (A416.)  “The first semester of this school 
year, when I had a parade of whiny, entitled kids run to the 
guidance department to tell on me for giving them the low 
grades they earned on their shoddy papers, sort of scarred me.  
I consider myself very fair with my grading.”  (Id.)  
 
 There were also blog posts that addressed the concepts 
of honor and academic integrity as well as Munroe’s concerns 
about student work habits and her negative attitude towards 
her job and her students.  Munroe blogged (in a March 13, 
2010 post) about her frustrating attempt to teach her students 
how to write a “Literary Analysis Paper” (describing, for 
instance, how, when she met with students to talk about their 
thesis statements, “I found that many of them didn’t bother 
even attempting to revise their statements, instead coming to 
the ‘conference’ expecting me to tell them exactly what the 
problem was and how to fix it (and, all the better, to write it 
for them if I was willing . . . ),” and how “one boy” said that 
he would ask his mother to look at the paper over the 
weekend).  (A222.)  Munroe lamented that “I teach and teach 
and teach, but no learning seems to happen.”  (A223.)  “I 
work my ass off to help them achieve success, but the only 
one learning how to write a better paper is me.  Like I said, 
I’m tired of the dance.  I just want to sit this one out.”  (Id.)  
On January 23, 2010, she likewise claimed that, with each 
passing day, “I’m coming to, more and more, realize that I 
need all the blessings I can get” because “[t]hese kids are the 
devil’s spawn.”  (A237.)  She then discussed in some detail 
the importance of honor, how she addressed this concept in 
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class (and the often hostile reaction on the part of some 
students), and, among other things, the fact that “TWO days 
after my lofty speeches, and a single day after they all signed 
the [honesty] pledge and pledge wall . . . someone [described 
as “‘that girl in the back in pink’”] had consciously made a 
cheat sheet and brought it in and intended to cheat.”2  (A240.)     
 The School District administration first learned of 
Munroe’s blog in February 2011 when a reporter from The 
Intelligencer (a local newspaper) began to ask questions about 
the blog.  Specifically, the reporter e-mailed Laws on 
February 8, 2011, asking if he was “aware of this blog, which 
the students apparently have been circulating on facebook and 
through other social media.”  (A258.)  On February 9, 2011, 
Lucabaugh met with Munroe, confronted her with printed 
copies of her blog posts, and placed her on immediate paid 
suspension.  At this point in time, the School District had no 
regulation specifically prohibiting a teacher from blogging on 
his or her own time (although it appears that a policy was 
subsequently adopted by the School District). 
 
 In his deposition testimony, Lucabaugh described the 
fevered reactions on the part of students and their parents to 
Munroe’s blog posts:  “Kids were furious.  They were livid.  
The calls that were coming in from parents, the e-mails that 
were coming in, kids had copies of it and they were 
distributing it in the halls.”  (A397.)  The principal 
                                                 
2 Munroe also referred to a co-worker named “Bill” as 
“a douche.”  (A210.)  She similarly claimed that the School 
District administration harassed a colleague until he resigned 
because it believed he was an ineffective teacher.   
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characterized CB East as “like a ticking time bomb” and 
asserted that the environment “was so incendiary” that the 
administration “thought we’re going to have a riot or a sit-in 
or worse.”  (A398.)  “To say it was a disruption to the 
learning environment is an understatement.”  (Id.)  According 
to Lucabaugh, Munroe was escorted from the building for her 
own safety. 
 
 In what he described as an unprecedented situation, 
Lucabaugh began receiving e-mails from parents indicating 
that they did not want Munroe to teach their children.  He 
continued to receive more and more e-mails throughout the 
summer, peaking in June and July of 2011.  He asked his 
superiors:  “‘What do I do with this?’  ‘Because I have to 
schedule the building and we have to get ready for class and I 
can’t not put them in class.  So what do I do with this’.  I said 
– first of all, I have – now I’m talking over seventy-five, 
eighty people, ninety people, one hundred people, a hundred 
and—and it was growing.”  (A399.)  It appears undisputed 
that the School District ultimately received over 200 “opt-
out” requests from parents.  While he recognized that it was 
the school board that had to decide how to handle these 
requests, Lucabaugh indicated that Munroe would probably 
not “have a chance” to teach in a “toxic environment” if “I 
already know that twenty-five students and their parents don’t 
want their child in her class and they’re in her class.”  (A400.)  
Accordingly, the decision was made to hire another teacher 
and have her “shadow” Munroe, i.e., teach the same exact 
schedule.  Munroe claims that, “[i]n August 2011, Defendants 
[in retaliation for Munroe’s expression] informed residents of 
the School District that they would honor all requests of 
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students to ‘opt out’ of Munroe’s classes.”  (Appellant’s Brief 
at 10 (citing A105-A111).)  According to Munroe, the School 
District “said it [allowed the opt-outs] in case students were 
uncomfortable returning to the classroom of a teacher who 
would say such things about them on her private blog.”  
(A108.)  She did not believe the School District’s justification 
because it was unprecedented to allow students to opt out of a 
class.  The real reason was because “they didn’t want me to 
have any students to teach.”  (A111.)  However, Munroe 
acknowledged that the whole situation was probably 
unprecedented.   
 The story was picked up by a widely-read internet 
news site, The Huffington Post, in a posting entitled “Natalie 
Munroe, Central Bucks Teacher, Suspended for Dissing 
Students On Blog.”  (A260.)  Lucabaugh made a statement to 
the media.  Munroe herself appeared on ABC, CBS, NBC, 
CNN, Fox News, and other television stations.  She also gave 
interviews to several print news sources, including the 
Associated Press, Reuters, Time Magazine, and the 
Philadelphia Inquirer. 
 
 According to The Huffington Post, “Laws says the 
posts should result in termination but the district is still 
investigating.”  (Id.)  In two e-mails, Laws expressed a desire 
to terminate Munroe’s employment.  In his February 11, 2011 
e-mail, he indicated that one of the School District’s 
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“constitutional lawyers” was researching the matter.3  (A262.)  
On February 17, 2011, he noted that, “[f]or the legal team, we 
still need to confirm a plan for termination.”  (A266.)  In a 
third e-mail dated February 24, 2011, Laws asked if Munroe’s 
teaching certificate could be revoked, which “would, in 
effect, be a potentially less costly approach and, in effect, net 
the same result as a termination.”  (A268.)   
 In any event, Munroe went out on maternity leave, 
which had already been scheduled before the blog was 
discovered.  Her leave ran from March 1, 2011 until the end 
of the 2010-2011 school year.  On June 15, 2011, Lucabaugh 
completed Munroe’s evaluation, concluding that her 
performance for the preceding academic term was 
unsatisfactory.  The evaluation purportedly relied on a 
number of different grounds for this negative rating, including 
ineffective instructional delivery practices and inappropriate 
use of a “nanny cam” during teaching hours.  However, it also 
observed that, in her blog posts, Munroe demonstrated 
“inappropriate or disrespectful interactions between teacher 
and students” and a “lack of knowledge of the Professional 
Code of Conduct.”  (A271-A272.)  In particular, it was noted 
that Munroe failed to use acceptable and professional 
                                                 
3 Noting that Munroe was scheduled to appear on a 
Fox News show (“Justice with Judge Jeanine”), Laws 
expressed surprise that people were supporting Munroe:  “I 
feel like I am in the twilight zone.  I can’t believe people 
support this woman and her right to ‘say anything.’”  (A262.)  
In a subsequent e-mail, a school board member stated that 
“[a]fter seeing her on the Fox news show I am confident we 
are doing the right thing.”  (A264.)   
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language and that her comments did not reflect sensitivity to 
the fundamental human rights of dignity, privacy, and respect.  
As a result, students and parents “expressed shock and 
outrage that their teacher would write about them in such 
derogatory terms and that their identity was not protected by 
the details provided in her blog which was placed on the 
internet to be accessed by anyone.”  (Id.)  “Students and 
parents stated verbally and in writing that they would not 
return to this teacher’s class because of what she had written 
in her blog,” and students indicated that they lacked 
confidence in this teacher on account of “the breach in the 
student-teacher relationship.”  (Id.)  In the summer of 2011, 
Laws submitted an “Educator Misconduct Complaint” to the 
Office of Chief Counsel of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education, alleging that Munroe engaged in “[c]onduct 
inappropriate for an Educator.” (A277.)  The complaint was 
dismissed on the grounds of legal insufficiency.  In addition, 
the School District denied Munroe’s request for a transfer to 
another school. 
 
 Munroe returned to work in August 2011.  The School 
District held a media briefing to announce her return.  In a 
prepared statement, Lucabaugh explained that, “[w]hile her 
actions have created an unfortunate and incredibly difficult 
situation, Mrs. Munroe maintains employee rights, and that is 
the sole reason for her return.”  (A285.)  According to the 
principal of CB East: 
 
Whether or not Mrs. Munroe had the legal right 
to express her views with such vitriol is not the 
heart of this issue.  No one here is contending 
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that she can’t say these things ... legally.  And 
for that reason, she has a legal right to return. 
 
What is at the heart of this issue, however, is the 
large-scale disruption her comments created, 
and the ensuing damage they have caused the 
young men and women to whom she was 
alluding.  Natalie Munroe’s actions placed the 
outstanding work that occurs in our school in 
question, placed my leadership in question, 
placed our students’ merit in the crosshairs of 
national scrutiny, breached trust with the 
community, and compromised her professional 
integrity.  Her comments were unprofessional, 
disrespectful, and disturbing, particularly 
coming from the heart of an educator.  
Moreover, and most importantly, they were 
crass and CRUEL.   
 
The obvious question left unanswered as the 
school year ended was whether or not Mrs. 
Munroe would be returning to teach in the fall.  
I should point out here that her maternity leave 
ends this month, and regardless of the moral 
and ethical issues surrounding her actions, Mrs. 
Munroe maintains employment rights. 
 
. . . .  
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Despite the fact that Mrs. Munroe retains legal 
employment rights, I would hope none of us 
lose sight of the real issue. 
 
The real issue is that while something may be 
legally right, it may not be ethically or morally 
right.  There are consequences that occur when 
a person chooses to exercise her rights and say 
outrageous, disrespectful, vulgar and cruel 
things about other people ... especially when it’s 
a teacher saying terrible things about the young 
men and women who are in her classroom. 
 
As a public school, we are charged with 
meeting the needs of every student who enters 
our doors, rich or poor, gifted or learning 
disabled, troubled or triumphant, and guiding 
them to their full potential so they receive the 
most precious gift an education can provide:  
opportunity for choice in life. 
 
What pains me the most in all of this is how the 
statements made by Mrs. Munroe have placed 
our students in the line of fire, and caused a 
nation to question their collective merit. 
 
(A286-A288.) 
 
 Munroe received negative performance evaluations 
over the course of the 2011-2012 school year (which, unlike 
the evaluation she received at the end of the previous school 
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year, did not expressly reference her blog and its effects), and 
she was required to complete detailed lesson plans (which she 
claimed were deliberately engineered to be too complicated to 
finish accurately).  On June 1, 2012, the School District 
notified Munroe of its intention to terminate her employment 
based on charges of failure to meet requirements set forth in 
performance improvement plans, incompetency, 
unsatisfactory classroom management, unsatisfactory delivery 
of instruction, and unsatisfactory lesson planning.  On June 
26, 2012, the School District formally terminated her 
employment. 
 
   Munroe filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleging that Defendants violated her First Amendment rights.  
“Specifically, Munroe claims that the school administration 
harassed and eventually terminated her after discovering a 
private blog in which Munroe has expressed criticism of the 
school, her co-workers, and her students.”  Munroe, 34 F. 
Supp. 3d at 533.  The parties completed discovery, and 
Defendants moved for summary judgment.  In a July 25, 2014 
order, the District Court granted their motion and entered 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against 
Munroe. 
 
 In its opinion, the District Court ultimately concluded 
that Defendants did not violate Munroe’s constitutional right 
to free expression.  “Because this Court has determined as a 
matter of law that Plaintiff’s comments do not merit 
protection under the balancing test established by [Pickering 
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)],” it believed it 
was unnecessary to reach the question of whether this speech 
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directly caused her termination.  Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 
540-41.  While it recognized that freedom of speech 
constitutes an indispensable condition of nearly every other 
right or liberty, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 
(1937) (characterizing freedom of thought and speech as “the 
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other 
form of freedom”), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the District Court pointed out 
that education “is one of the most heavily protected interests 
in modern American jurisprudence,” Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d 
at 541 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954)).  “In this case, Plaintiff’s speech, in both effect and 
tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any 
legitimate interest in its expression, and thus her expression 
was not protected.”  Id. 
 
II. 
 “[A] State may not discharge an employee on a basis 
that infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected 
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interest in freedom of speech.”4  Rankin v. McPherson, 483 
U.S. 378, 383 (1987).  Free and unhindered debate on matters 
of public importance constitutes a core value of the First 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.  
Accordingly, public employees do not surrender all of their 
First Amendment rights merely because of their employment 
status.  See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 
(2006). 
 
 Nevertheless, “the State has interests as an employer in 
regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly 
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the 
speech of the citizenry in general.”  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 
568.  In short, “the government as employer” possesses “far 
                                                 
4 The District Court possessed subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over a district court order granting a motion 
for summary judgment, see, e.g., Monaco v. Am. Gen. 
Assurance Co., 359 F.3d 296, 299 (3d Cir. 2004).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The facts must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  
See, e.g., Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 
267 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 
We note that the Pennsylvania School Boards 
Association (“PSBA”) has filed an amicus brief in support of 
Defendants.      
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broader powers than does the government as sovereign.”  
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality 
opinion).  “When a citizen enters government service, the 
citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or 
her freedom.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.  Government 
employers, like their private counterparts, still “need a 
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and 
actions; without it, there would be little chance for the 
efficient provision of public services.”  Id..  As we explained 
in Miller v. Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008), 
“public employers are still employers, and they therefore have 
the same concern for efficiency and the need to review and 
evaluate employees as any other employer in order to ensure 
that the actions of employees do not interfere with the 
performance of public functions,” id. at 547; see also, e.g., 
Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979, 987 
(3d Cir. 2014) (“At the same time, the Supreme Court also 
aptly recognizes the government’s countervailing interest—as 
an employer—in maintaining control over their employees’ 
words and actions for the proper performance of the 
workplace.”).  A public employer accordingly may impose 
speech restrictions that are necessary for efficient and 
effective operations.  See, e.g., Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 987 
(“Thus, ‘[s]o long as employees are speaking as citizens 
about matters of public concern, they must face only those 
speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to 
operate efficiently and effectively.  [Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 
419].”).          
 “To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a 
public employee must show that (1) his speech is protected by 
the First Amendment and (2) the speech was a substantial or 
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motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action, which, if 
both are proved, shifts the burden to the employer to prove 
that (3) the same action would have been taken even if the 
speech had not occurred.”  Id. at 986.  In order for his or her 
speech to rise to the level of constitutionally protected 
expression, the employee must speak as a citizen (and not as 
an employee), “the speech must involve a matter of public 
concern,” and “the government must lack an ‘adequate 
justification’ for treating the employee differently than the 
general public based on its needs as an employer under the 
Pickering balancing test.”  Id. at 987 (quoting Gorum v. 
Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009)).  The Pickering 
balancing test requires the courts to “‘balance . . . the interests 
of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters 
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.’”  Id. at 991 (quoting 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).  We must also consider, on the 
employee’s side, the interest of the public in the speech at 
issue.  Id.  The question of whether or not speech is protected 
by the First Amendment constitutes a question of law.  See, 
e.g., Miller, 544 F.3d at 548; Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 
455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
 Defendants ask this Court to affirm the District Court’s 
order on four different grounds:  (1) Munroe’s speech, in light 
of its content, form, and context, did not implicate a matter of 
public concern; (2) her speech was likely to cause—and, in 
fact, did cause—disruption “to the rendering of educational 
services by the District,” and the Pickering balancing test 
accordingly “weighed in favor of Defendants and would not 
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have prevented them from taking adverse action against 
Plaintiff based upon her speech” (Appellees’ Brief at 22); (3) 
Munroe’s speech did not constitute a substantial factor in the 
various negative performance evaluations she received or in 
her eventual termination; and (4) the School District would 
have pursued the same course of  action even in the absence 
of any protected activity.  We assume that Munroe’s speech 
satisfied the “public concern” requirement.  However, we 
conclude that her speech was likely to cause—and, in fact, 
did cause—disruption and that, under the circumstances, the 
School District’s interest outweighed Munroe’s interest, as 
well as the interest of the public, in her speech.  Because her 
speech was not constitutionally protected, we (like the 
District Court) need not, and do not, reach Defendants’ 
causation arguments. 
 
A. The “Public Concern” Requirement 
 
 The Supreme Court has explained that speech 
implicates a matter of public concern when “it can ‘be fairly 
considered as relating to any matter of political, social or 
other concern to the community,’ [Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 146 (1983)], or when ‘it is a subject of legitimate 
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value 
and concern to the public,’ [City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 
U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (per curiam)].”  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 
U.S. 443, 453 (2011).  Defendants acknowledge that, 
“[b]ecause of the nature of their employment, speech by 
public employees is deemed to be speech about public 
concern when it relates to their employment” so long as it is 
not speech upon matters of purely personal interest.  
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(Appellees’ Brief at 30.)  Accordingly, speech that relates 
solely to mundane employment grievances does not implicate 
a matter of public concern.  See, e.g., Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh 
Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 1992).  In 
determining whether the speech at issue satisfies this element, 
courts should take into account the employee’s motivation as 
well as whether it is important to our system of self-
government that the expression take place.  See, e.g., Azzaro 
v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 978 (3d Cir. 1997) (en 
banc); Versage v. Twp. of Clinton, 984 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 
(3d Cir. 1993).  “The arguably ‘inappropriate or controversial 
character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether 
it deals with a matter of public concern.’”  Snyder, 562 U.S. 
at 453 (quoting Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387). 
 
 “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of 
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and 
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole 
record.”  Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.  In Miller, we 
considered whether a letter written by an adult probation 
officer to the president judge of the county court of common 
pleas rose to the level of constitutionally protected speech.  
Miller, 544 F.3d at 546-51.  We acknowledged that Miller’s 
statements that the county probation office was being run 
ineffectively and that her supervisors called probation clients 
“scum” clearly referred to matters of public concern.  Id. at 
549.  However, the Court then explained that her statements 
must be viewed in the context of the letter as a whole.  Id. at 
550.  “We can not ‘cherry pick’ something that may impact 
the public while ignoring the manner and context in which 
that statement was made or that public concern expressed.  
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Our inquiry must also consider the form and circumstance of 
the speech in question.”  Id.   The letter focused on Miller’s 
private grievances as an employee, and the statements about 
the office’s ineffective operations and the supervisor’s 
comments were collateral to the thrust of her complaint.  Id.  
She clearly stated her reason for writing, i.e., that she would 
no longer work under the stressful conditions she had to face 
since an individual named Foresman became her supervisor.  
Id.  “That declaration provides the context for all that 
follows.”  Id.  In short, “Miller was upset with Foresman’s 
supervision of her, and could no longer tolerate being 
supervised by her,” and, given this context, “the brief 
references to an issue of public concern” could not be read as 
anything other than “a multi-faceted personal ‘gripe’ not 
unlike that voiced in [a questionnaire addressed by the 
Supreme Court in [Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 
(1983)].”5  Id.  The personal context of the letter, in addition 
                                                 
5 In Connick, an assistant district attorney, who 
opposed the district attorney’s plan to transfer her to another 
district, distributed a questionnaire to her co-workers 
regarding this transfer policy, their level of trust in 
supervisors, office morale, the establishment of a grievance 
committee, and whether they were pressured into working on 
political campaigns.  See Miller, 544 F.3d at 548-49 
(summarizing Connick).  As we explained in Miller, the 
Supreme Court, “after viewing the statement [about pressure 
to work on political campaigns] in context and considering 
the circumstances in which she circulated [the 
questionnaire],” concluded that this “one expression of public 
concern did not outweigh the District Attorney’s interest in 
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to the tangential relationship between the issues of public 
concern and the letter’s overall thrust, “so minimizes any 
public concern in the subject of her expression as to tip the 
First Amendment balance in favor of her employer.”  Id. at 
551.  We further noted that the letter harshly criticized 
Miller’s supervisors, seemingly offered President Judge 
Saxton an ultimatum, and was disrespectful to the president 
judge himself.  Id.  
 
 In the end, we stated that Miller, by “launching into an 
attack on management and her supervisors,” managed to 
“brush ever so gently” against a matter of public concern.  Id.  
However, “that seemingly serendipitous encounter does not 
convert her personal grievance into protected speech.”  Id.  
 
 According to Defendants, the District Court likewise 
determined that Munroe’s speech failed to implicate a matter 
of public concern.  On the one hand, the District Court stated 
that, “although the blog as a whole is dominated by personal 
issues, within certain blog posts are occasional passages that 
touch upon broad issues of academic integrity, the value of 
honor, and students’ lack of effort.”  Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d 
at 537 (footnotes omitted).  According to the District Court, 
each topic represented a matter of political and social 
concern, despite Munroe’s use of strong language.  On the 
other hand, the District Court proceeded to point out that 
“context matters” and to quote from our ruling in Miller.  Id.  
                                                                                                             
the efficient operation of his office because the questionnaire 
as a whole was of such limited value to the public.”  Id. at 
549 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 154). 
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It then observed that, on the few occasions where Munroe 
addressed issues of public concern on her blog, she did so in 
order to discuss personal matters.  “Far from implicating 
larger discussions of educational reform, pedagogical 
methods, or specific school policies, Plaintiff mostly 
complained about the failure of her students to live up to her 
expectations, and focused on negative interactions between 
herself and her students.”  Id. at 537-38.  The District Court 
specifically focused on the January 20, 2010 blog post.  In 
this post, Munroe began by noting that she was blogging at 
work and then explained that she was entering grades and 
comments for the students’ report cards, which she used to 
take very seriously.  Instead of engaging in “any number of 
important discussions (such as the value of the grading 
system, her personal opinion on the effectiveness of assigning 
grades, etc.) that might have touched upon issues of public 
concern,” Munroe stated that her scorn for some students was 
so extreme that she found it difficult even to indicate that they 
cooperated in class and that, for some students, none of the 
comments fit.  Id. at 538. 
 
 We believe that the District Court ultimately disposed 
of Munroe’s retaliation claim on the basis of the Pickering 
balancing test.  Accordingly, it went on to observe that, even 
though she “may have occasionally written as a private 
citizen on matters of public concern,” Munroe’s “opprobrious 
tone” was likely to cause a strong reaction from anyone 
connected with her high school.  Id.  After “balancing the 
interests of the parties,” id., the District Court reached the 
conclusion that “Plaintiff’s speech, in both effect and tone, 
was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any legitimate 
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interest in its expression, and thus her expression was not 
protected,” id. at 541; see also, e.g., id. at 540-41 (“Because 
this Court has determined as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s 
comments do not merit protection under the balancing test 
established by Pickering, . . . .”).  Under the circumstances, 
the District Court’s discussion of the “public concern” 
concept are best understood as part of its application of the 
Pickering balancing test.  In short, it appears that the District 
Court, in balancing the respective interests, accorded minimal 
weight to the interests of Munroe and the public in her speech 
because “the blog’s ‘overall thrust’ devalues the discussion of 
public issues.”  Id. at 538 (quoting Miller, 544 F.3d at 550). 
 
 Of course, this Court may affirm on any ground 
supported by the record.  See, e.g., Fairview Twp. v. U.S. 
EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).  Defendants 
present a strong case for why Munroe’s speech failed to touch 
on a matter of public concern.  While Munroe contends that 
her blog was “replete with references to her life’s experience 
as an English teacher in an affluent, suburban Philadelphia 
School District” (Appellant’s Brief at 23), she also 
acknowledges that this blog was intended as a vehicle to keep 
in touch with friends (and accordingly was never meant to be 
viewed by the public at large) and that she discussed such 
mundane topics as her favorite restaurants and family 
vacations.  She admits that most of the “84 blog entries” 
published between August 9, 2009 and November 25, 2010 
had “nothing to do with her school or work.”  (Id. at 6 (citing 
A208-A254, A412-A452).)  According to Munroe, it is 
illogical for us to review each and every one of her blog 
posts.  We clearly should take into account the fact that it was 
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not her blog posts on mundane topics like pie recipes and 
movie reviews that “went viral” once the media discovered 
her blog.  Defendants themselves focused on Munroe’s 
student-related blog posts (to the point of distributing 
“[c]opies of Mrs. Munroe’s blog pertaining to students” at a 
media briefing (A286)).6  However, it is also well established 
that (as we explained in Miller) the courts “can not ‘cherry 
pick’ something that may impact the public while ignoring 
the manner and context in which that statement was made or 
that public concern expressed.”  Miller, 544 F.3d at 550.  
Defendants (rather persuasively) contend that “a plain reading 
of Plaintiff’s blog readily reveals that she was actually using 
it to vent personal grievances or express her visceral reaction 
to her daily experiences.”  (Appellees’ Brief at 32.)  For 
instance, her April 3, 2010 blog post featured a list of “Things 
From This Day That Bothered Me,” which were almost all 
work-related.  (A213.)  However, this list appeared in the 
middle of a post that included lists of “Artists Who Annoy the 
Crap Outta Me and Who I Must Turn Off as Soon as I Hear 
the Opening Bars to Their Songs, But Who Are Regarded as 
‘Talent’ by Some People” and “Things I Liked About This 
Day” (none of which involved her work as a public school 
teacher).  (Id.)  Even the January 20, 2010 blog post—in 
which Munroe offered several comments she would like to 
see added to the “canned” comment list used for students’ 
report cards—was phrased in rather personal terms.  She 
noted, for example, that the grading process was “a complete 
                                                 
6 At oral argument, counsel for Munroe suggested that 
only one blog post actually “went viral,” the January 20, 2010 
post setting forth her suggested report card comments.   
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pain in the ass” and that her “scornful feelings” about certain 
students “reach such fever pitch” that it was difficult for her 
to put down “‘cooperative in class.’”  (A245.)  In the end, 
Munroe’s various comments about her students arguably were 
no different than, inter alia, her restaurant critique. 
 
 Nevertheless, we reluctantly assume for the purposes 
of this opinion that Munroe’s speech satisfied the “public 
concern” requirement. 
 
 As the District Court recognized, there were, at the 
very least, occasional blog posts that touched on broader 
issues like academic integrity, honor, and the importance of 
hard work.  In particular, Munroe explained in some detail 
how she attempted to address the concept of honor in class 
and the often hostile reaction on the part of her students to her 
efforts (with one student possibly creating a cheat sheet only 
“TWO days after my lofty speeches, and a single day after 
they all signed the pledge and pledge wall” (A240)).  In the 
critical January 20, 2010 blog post, she addressed some 
problems she saw with the grading process, specifically 
highlighting her past efforts to choose the right combination 
of positive and negative comments for the report cards and 
indicating that the “canned comments” did not accurately 
reflect her assessment of students’ performance.  (A245.)   
The list of suggested comments then were a rather clumsy 
attempt to use humor to highlight her points.  Although the 
District Court criticized Munroe for failing to bolster her 
“personal invective” with “larger discussions of educational 
reform, pedagogical methods, or specific school policies,” 
Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 537-38, it also recognized that the 
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inappropriate or controversial nature of a statement is 
irrelevant to the “public concern” inquiry, see, e.g., Snyder, 
562 U.S. at 453.  After all, humor, satire, and even “personal 
invective” could be used in order to make or embellish a point 
about a matter of political, social or other concern to the 
community, such as a school district’s grading policies and 
practices.  Munroe’s inclusion of her list of proposed report 
card comments in a post critiquing the school district’s 
grading process likewise indicated that this blog post 
ultimately involved more than a purely personal gripe against 
her students or the administration.  In contrast, Miller’s letter 
set forth what was essentially a personal gripe against 
management and her supervisors.  See Miller, 544 F.3d at 
550-51. 
 
 Munroe’s blog posts also became the subject of 
extensive media coverage, and Munroe gave several 
interviews to national news organizations wherein she 
“defended her blog entries, refused to apologize for her 
opinions, and attempted to focus attention on the ‘Education 
Debate.’”  (Appellant’s Brief at 8 (citing A114-A115).)  We 
note that Munroe acknowledged that these interviews were 
driven largely by her desire to defend herself and her actions, 
and we also are troubled by the fact that the record and 
briefing contains essentially no evidence regarding the 
content of these interviews besides Munroe’s general 
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characterization of them.7  In any event, the extensive media 
coverage of her blog and the statements she made to the 
media generally indicated that Munroe met the “public 
concern” element.8  See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 543 (stating that 
                                                 
7 Like Munroe herself, neither Defendants nor the 
District Court have devoted much attention to the subsequent 
media coverage.  In a footnote, the District Court stated that it 
focused on the blog posts because the record was clear that 
Defendants’ actions were based on the posts, and it indicated 
that its analysis would not change upon consideration of the 
interviews.  The dissent relies heavily on Munroe’s 
statements to the media in arguing that the case should be 
remanded.  We note, however, that the evidence cited by the 
dissent is limited to arguments and characterizations sprinkled 
in the briefs.  We have no doubt that Munroe gave interviews 
to the media, but the record is devoid of any actual evidence 
as to the content of those interviews, rendering it impossible 
to assess her interest in the actual speech and the effect such 
speech might have had on the School District.  The evidence 
cited by the dissent regarding the content or tone of her media 
interviews rests primarily on a news article that is not part of 
the record.    
8 We also question whether the media and the public 
were (as Munroe claims) really interested in her thoughts 
about the so-called “education debate.”  We wonder whether 
they were interested instead in the fact that a teacher would 
post derogatory comments about her students on her blog and 
whether public school teachers can (and should) make such 
comments. 
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speech implicates matter of public concern when it is subject 
of legitimate news interest). 
 
 As part of their discussion of the Pickering balancing 
test, Defendants rely on the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Melzer v. Board of Education, 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003), 
and the ruling by the Seventh Circuit in Craig v. Rich 
Township High School District 227, 736 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2300 (2014).  Both circuit 
courts ultimately rejected retaliation claims—filed by 
educators who alleged that they were terminated for 
exercising their First Amendment rights—pursuant to 
Pickering.  Craig, 736 F.3d at 1118-21; Melzer, 336 F.3d at 
197-200.  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit also assumed that 
a teacher’s First Amendment activity satisfied the “public 
concern” element, Melzer, 336 F.3d at 196, and the Seventh 
Circuit expressly determined that a guidance counselor’s 
speech implicated a matter of public concern, Craig, 736 F.3d 
at 1116-18. 
 
 In Melzer, a Bronx High School of Science teacher 
claimed that his constitutional rights to freedom of 
association and speech were violated when the board of 
education terminated his teaching position “in retaliation for 
his membership in the North American Man/Boy Love 
Association (NAMBLA or Association).”  Melzer, 336 F.3d 
at 188-89.  The Second Circuit assumed arguendo that “his 
activity centers on a matter of public concern, and is thus 
protected.”  Id. at 196.  The Melzer court indicated that, “even 
if we were somehow to parse Melzer’s activity into the public 
concern test, most of it would likely pass.”  Id.  In short, 
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NABMLA’s stated goal is to effect change in public attitudes 
and laws regarding the age of consent, and advocacy in 
support of such a goal “is certainly a matter of public 
concern, regardless of the underlying subject matter.”  Id. 
 
 The plaintiff in Craig “self-published a short book of 
adult relationship advice entitled ‘It’s Her Fault.’”  Craig, 736 
F.3d at 1113.  “And when we say ‘adult,’ we mean it in every 
sense of the word—in his book, Craig repeatedly discusses 
sexually provocative themes and uses sexually explicit 
terminology.”  Id.  The Seventh Circuit agreed with Craig that 
his work dealt with a subject of general interest to the public 
(and that the district court erred by concluding otherwise).  Id. 
at 1115-18.  While the district court was correct that some 
parts of “It’s Her Fault” (like Craig’s description of his own 
sexual exploits) would not relate to a matter of public interest 
if viewed in isolation, it was wrong to conclude “that just 
because the book happened to touch[ ] on a matter of public 
interest (relationships between men and women) does not 
mean that it addresses a matter of public concern.’”  Id. at 
1117.  According to the Craig court, “[t]hat is precisely what 
public concern means—speech directed to the public need 
only address a ‘matter[ ] in which the public might be 
interested’ in order to be eligible for First Amendment 
protection.”  Id.  “Viewed as a whole, ‘It’s Her Fault’ 
addresses adult relationship dynamics, a subject that interests 
a significant segment of the public.  The proliferation of 
advice columns dealing with precisely this topic is a 
testament to its newsworthiness.”  Id.. 
 
38 
 
 Although we assume that Munroe’s speech implicated 
a matter of public concern, this does not mean that her speech 
constituted speech protected by the First Amendment.  We 
conclude (like the Second and Seventh Circuits) that, even if 
Munroe’s speech was a matter of public concern, it was not 
constitutionally protected because the Pickering balancing 
test weighed in favor of Defendants. 
 
B. Pickering Balancing Test 
 
“On the employee’s side of the scale, we must 
consider the interests of both [Munroe] and the public in the 
speech at issue.”  Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 991. On the other 
side of the Pickering balancing test, the Court must address 
“the government’s legitimate and countervailing interest, as 
an employer, in ‘promoting workplace efficiency and 
avoiding workplace disruption.’”  Id. (quoting McGreevy v. 
Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005)).  The government 
need not show the existence of actual disruption if it 
establishes that disruption is likely to occur because of the 
speech.  See, e.g., id. at 992 & n.7.  While the inquiry varies 
given the nature of the speech at issue, courts typically 
consider whether the speech impairs discipline or employee 
harmony, has a detrimental impact on close working 
relationships requiring personal loyalty and confidence, 
impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties, or interferes 
with the enterprise’s regular operations.  See, e.g., id. at 991.  
“The balancing we must undertake is a fact-intensive inquiry 
that requires consideration of the entire record, and must yield 
different results depending on the relative strengths of the 
issue of public concern and the employer’s interest.”  Miller, 
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544 F.3d at 548.  In short, the inquiry “involves a sliding 
scale,” in which “the amount of disruption a public employer 
has to tolerate is directly proportional to the importance of the 
disputed speech to the public.”  Id. at 549 n.2; see also, e.g., 
Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 991 (“The more tightly the First 
Amendment embraces the employee’s speech, the more 
vigorous a showing of disruption must be made by the 
employer.”). 
 
 We begin with Munroe’s alleged interest and the 
alleged interest of the public in her blog posts and subsequent 
statements to the media.  According to Munroe, the District 
Court was so preoccupied with her personal complaints (and 
the manner in which she chose to express herself) that it 
accorded little if any weight to these interests.  Munroe 
contends that “the public was highly interested in a public 
school teacher’s thoughts about the education debate,” and 
her “blog, likely because of the strong language used by her, 
percolated a national conversation about the performance and 
expectations of students in an affluent, suburban public high 
school.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 26.)  Given our reluctance to 
assume that the speech at issue here implicated a matter of 
public concern in the first place, we determine that the 
interests of Munroe and the public in this speech were entitled 
to (at best) only minimal weight under the Pickering 
balancing test. 
 
In Dougherty v. School District of Philadelphia, 772 
F.3d 979 (3d Cir. 2014), this Court recently applied the 
Pickering balancing test in favor of an individual who was 
fired from his position as “the Deputy Chief Business Officer 
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for Operations and Acting Chief of Operations for the Office 
of the Deputy Superintendent within the School District of 
Philadelphia” after he publicly disclosed the alleged 
misconduct of the school district superintendent in steering a 
contract, id. at 982-83.  According to Munroe, the 
Philadelphia School District attempted to devalue the 
constitutional merit of a teacher’s expression on the grounds 
that his statements were focused on personal concerns about 
his employment—an attempt this Court rejected.  She claims 
that the District Court similarly erred here in devaluing her 
speech.  However, she actually quotes from the section of the 
Dougherty opinion addressing the distinct question of 
whether Dougherty was speaking as a citizen.  Id. at 987-90.  
While it is undisputed that Munroe was speaking here as a 
private citizen, it was, in turn, uncontested that Dougherty’s 
speech involved a matter of public concern.  Id. at 987.  
Furthermore, Dougherty was not a teacher; he instead served 
as a business and operations manager for a school district 
responsible for, among other things, developing capital 
projects and soliciting bids for these projects.  Id. at 982-83.  
The issue addressed in Dougherty and the facts presented 
therefore are readily distinguishable. 
 
We further explained that “‘[s]peech involving 
government impropriety occupies the highest rung of First 
Amendment protection.’”  Id. at 991 (quoting Swineford v. 
Snyder Cnty., 15 F.3d 1258, 1274 (3d Cir. 1994)).  Noting 
that Dougherty’s report to The Philadelphia Inquirer exposing 
the superintendent’s alleged misconduct constituted an 
archetypical example of this sort of expression, the Court 
observed that the defendants had to satisfy a truly heavy 
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burden “[a]gainst the public’s significant interest in 
Dougherty’s act of whistleblowing” (a burden that they did 
not meet).  Id.; see also, e.g., id. at 987 n.5 (“As we have long 
recognized, ‘[d]isclosing corruption, fraud, and illegality in a 
government agency is a matter of significant public 
concern.’” (quoting Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 
823, 829 (3d Cir. 1994))).  Munroe does not claim that she 
exposed any corruption, fraud, or other forms of illegal 
conduct on the part of Defendants (or anyone else).  If 
anything, her blog more closely resembled “It’s Her Fault”—
the work of adult relationship advice at issue in Craig—as 
opposed to the acts of whistleblowing considered in 
Dougherty.  While it determined that this book touched on a 
matter of public concern, the Seventh Circuit went on to 
explain (as part of its Pickering analysis) that a guidance 
counselor’s “view of relationships is not the sort of topic of 
expression that Defendants would require a compelling 
reason to restrict.”  Craig, 736 F.3d at 1120. 
 
Given our assessment of the interests of Munroe and 
the public in her speech, Defendants were not required to 
make an especially vigorous showing of actual or potential 
disruption in this case.  However, even if we were to assume 
arguendo that her speech “possesses the highest value,” 
Melzer, 336 F.3d at 198, we would still conclude that 
Defendants met their burden.  Simply put, “Plaintiff’s speech, 
in both effect and tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to 
diminish any legitimate interest in its expression, and thus her 
expression was not protected.”  Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 
541.    
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Munroe attacks the District Court for focusing on the 
opprobrious tone of her blog posts and suggesting that her 
expression would be afforded greater protection if she 
engaged in a more lofty discussion of educational issues.  
Claiming that “[i]t is essential to remember that ‘. . . the very 
core of the First Amendment is that the government cannot 
regulate speech ‘because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content,’” she contends that the District Court’s 
content-based approach “has no place in the Pickering test.”  
(Appellant’s Brief at 24 (quoting Startzell v. City of Phila., 
533 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2008)).)  However, the opinion 
she cites did not involve a retaliation claim against a public 
employer.  See Startzell, 533 F.3d at 188 (“The parties to the 
events surrounding the October 2004 OutFest [a street 
festival] have differing, indeed contrary, views of the 
protection that the First Amendment affords to organizers of 
events that generate counter-protests and the rights of those 
counter-protestors.”).  It is well established that a government 
has broader powers to regulate speech when it acts as an 
employer than when it acts as a sovereign.  See, e.g., Waters, 
511 U.S. at 671 (plurality opinion); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 
568.  Accordingly, in order for his or her speech to be 
protected by the First Amendment, the employee must speak 
as a citizen, the speech must implicate a matter of public 
concern, and, of particular significance here, “the government 
must lack an ‘adequate justification’ for treating the employee 
differently than the general public based on its needs as an 
employer under the Pickering balancing test.”  Dougherty, 
772 F.3d at 987.  While the inappropriate tone of the speech 
may be irrelevant to the “public concern” inquiry, see, e.g., 
Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453, such considerations could play a 
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critical role in ascertaining the existence and likelihood of 
disruption.  After all, it would seem more likely that an 
employee’s comments about his or her supervisors and co-
workers would impair discipline or employee harmony if they 
are phrased in less “elevated”—and more “opprobrious”—
terms.  Likewise, invective directed against the very persons 
that the governmental agency is meant to serve could be 
expected to have serious consequences for the performance of 
the speaker’s duties and the agency’s regular operations.  The 
First Amendment, for instance, does not require a public 
employer “to sit idly by” while its police officers and 
firefighters make racial insults against “those they are hired to 
serve and protect.”  Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 183 
(2d Cir. 2006); see also, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70 
(“The statements are in no way directed towards any person 
with whom appellant would normally be in contact in the 
course of his daily work as a teacher.”); Craig, 736 F.3d at 
1119 (“An employer may have more leeway in restricting the 
speech of an employee whose position requires contact with 
the public.”). 
 
Similarly, we believe it was appropriate for the District 
Court to consider whether Munroe’s speech “would erode the 
necessary trust and respect between Munroe and her 
students.”  Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 539.  Munroe views 
such considerations as nothing more than “code” for 
punishing unpopular speech, and she contends that they 
would allow a school district to fire a teacher on the grounds 
of political affiliation, religion, or grading policies, thereby 
making a mockery out of the First Amendment itself.  (Id. at 
27.)  She even goes so far as to claim that “[h]igh school 
44 
 
students are not required to trust or respect their teachers.”  
(Id. at 27-28.)  In Pickering itself, the Supreme Court 
indicated that it was appropriate to consider whether a 
teacher’s expression “either impeded the teacher’s proper 
performance of his daily duties in the classroom” or 
“interfered with the regular operation of the schools 
generally.”9  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73 (footnote 
omitted).  As the District Court noted, the job of a public 
school educator implicates a rather special set of 
circumstances and responsibilities.  “Plaintiff worked in a 
school, where students ‘are impressionable and their 
attendance is involuntary.’”  Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 539 
(quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)).  
One generally expects that a teacher would:  (1) refrain from 
expressing outright hostility and disgust against them on her 
blog (at least where the blog itself was not protected by a 
password and evidently could be (and, in this case, was) 
discovered by the media and members of the school 
community); (2) when confronted with her derogatory 
                                                 
9 The Pickering Court determined that a letter a teacher 
sent to a local newspaper criticizing the school board’s 
handling of bond issue proposals and its subsequent 
allocation of financial resources and charging the 
superintendent with attempting to prevent teachers from 
opposing or criticizing the proposed bond issue constituted 
protected speech because, even if he made some erroneous 
statements, it could neither be shown nor presumed that his 
letter impeded the performance of his daily classroom duties 
or interfered with the regular operation of the school.  
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73.     
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comments, publicly defended what she had said; and (3) in 
the process, singled out specific and identifiable students as 
the targets of her ire.  As the PSBA helpfully notes in its 
amicus brief, the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Practice 
and Conduct for Educators states, inter alia, that professional 
educators are expected to value “the worth and dignity of 
every person, student and colleague alike,” 22 Pa. Code § 
235.3, and to exercise care in maintaining confidentiality, 22 
Pa. Code § 235.4(b)(9). 
 
“The position of public school teacher ‘requires a 
degree of public trust not found in many other positions of 
public employment.’”  Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 539 
(quoting Melzer, 336 F.3d at 198).  A teacher generally acts 
in loco parentis for his or her students.  Melzer, 336 F.3d at 
199; see also Craig, 736 F.3d at 1119 (“The fact that Craig 
works closely with students at a public school as a counselor 
confers upon him an inordinate amount of trust and 
authority.” (citing Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584; Melzer, 336 
F.3d at 198)).  Like the Second Circuit, “[w]e acknowledge 
the truism that community reaction cannot dictate whether an 
employee’s constitutional rights are protected.”  Melzer, 336 
F.3d at 199.  The First Amendment generally does not permit 
the so-called “heckler’s veto,” i.e., “allowing the public, with 
the government’s help, to shout down unpopular ideas that 
stir anger.”  Id.; see also Craig, 736 F.3d at 1121 (referring to 
“heckler’s veto” in which unpopular speech is prohibited on 
account of community’s possible reaction).   However, there 
is a special (perhaps even unique) relationship that exists 
between a public school teacher (or other educators, like a 
guidance counselor), on the one hand, and his or her students 
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and their parents, on the other hand.  Simply put, neither 
parents nor students could be considered as outsiders seeking 
to “heckle” an educator into silence—“‘rather they are 
participants in public education, without whose cooperation 
public education as a practical matter cannot function.’”  
Craig, 736 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Melzer, 336 F.3d at 199).  
We accordingly agree with the Second and Seventh Circuits 
that it is generally appropriate to consider the reactions of 
students and parents to an educator’s speech under the 
Pickering balancing test.10  Id. (“Given the nature of this case, 
                                                 
10 We further note that this case does not involve an 
attempt to fire a teacher because of student and parent 
reactions to his or her political affiliation or religion.    
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we think it appropriate to consider Defendants’ interests in 
preserving a safe counseling environment at Rich Central as 
                                                                                                             
Munroe suggests that the effects of her speech on the 
trust and respect of her students should not be considered 
because this Court’s ruling in Dougherty did not identify such 
effects as a factor to be taken into account under the Pickering 
balancing test.  We have already noted that Dougherty was 
not a teacher—he was a business and operations officer.  
Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 982-83.  We also observed in 
Dougherty that “the test for disruption varies depending upon 
the nature of the speech” and that the “factors a court 
typically considers” include whether the speech impedes the 
performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the 
regular operations of the enterprise.  Id. at 991; see also, e.g., 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73 (asking whether speech 
impeded teacher’s proper performance of daily duties in 
classroom or interfered with regular operation of the schools 
generally).  Furthermore, we agree with Munroe that her 
relationship with Defendants was not the kind of relationship 
that required personal loyalty or confidence.  See, e.g. 
Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 992 (“[B]ased on the District Court’s 
reading of the record, the evidence does not compel the 
conclusion that Dougherty’s relationship with Dr. Ackerman 
[the superintendent] or Dr. Nunery [the deputy 
superintendent] is ‘the kind of relationship[ ] for which it can 
persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence 
are necessary to [its] proper functioning.’” (quoting 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570)).  However, a defendant need not 
establish the existence of such a relationship to prevail under 
Pickering.    
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part of our analysis.”); Melzer, 336 F.3d at 199 (“Any 
disruption created by parents can be fairly characterized as 
internal disruption to the operation of the school, a factor 
which may be accounted for in the balancing test and which 
may outweigh a public employee’s rights.”). 
 
We find that Munroe’s various expressions of hostility 
and disgust against her students would disrupt her duties as a 
high school teacher and the functioning of the School District.  
Munroe, for her part, does not really deal with the specific 
language she used in her blog posts.  Instead, she tends to 
describe her student-related comments in rather general 
terms, e.g., she purportedly made comments about her 
students’ unwillingness to work hard and cooperate in school, 
the lack of student accountability, and the lack of support for 
teachers on the part of both parents and administrators.  
However, Munroe’s list of “proposed report card comments” 
(Appellant’s Brief at 25) included statements like—“A 
complete and utter jerk in all ways,” “Rat-like,” “Lazy 
asshole,” “Sneaky, complaining, jerkoff,” “Dresses like a 
street walker,” “Rude, belligerent, argumentative fuck,” “Am 
concerned your kid is going to come in one day and open fire 
on the school. (Wish I was kidding.),” “I hear the trash 
company is hiring,” “Utterly loathsome in all imaginable 
ways,” and “There’s no other way to say this:  I hate your 
kid” (A245-A246).  Munroe went so far as to include a 
depiction of a school bus at the top of the post—together with 
a comment disparaging special needs students:  “I Don’t Care 
If You Lick The Windows, Take The Special Bus Or 
Occasionally Pee On Yourself . . . You Hang In There 
Sunshine, You’re Friggin Special.”  (A245 (emphasis 
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omitted).)  Even if intended as part of a comedic exercise, 
such characterizations speak for themselves.  Simply put, they 
were despicable.  Furthermore, Munroe, in multiple blog 
posts, ranted against her own students.  To give just a few 
examples, she called them “the devil’s spawn” (A237), 
“Noisy, crazy, sloppy, lazy LOAFERS” (A440), and “rude, 
disengaged, lazy whiners” (id.).  As the District Court then 
explained, “[t]he discovery of the blog undermines Plaintiff’s 
early assumptions that her small readership and relative 
anonymity would protect her personal comments from 
reaching their subjects, especially as the blog was not 
password protected.”  Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 538.  In 
addition, students would have been able to identify 
themselves or their classmates in at least some of her 
derogatory comments.  Parents likewise could occasionally 
identify both themselves and their children from her “vivid 
and personal appraisal of [student] character.”  Id. at 539.  In 
her blog post identifying the “Things From This Day That 
Bothered Me,” Munroe singled out “the jerk who was out 3 
days around our last assessment because his family took him 
on trip to Puerto Rico” and who “was out again today (the 
date of another assessment) because his family took him to 
the effing Master’s golf shit over Easter break.”  (A213.)  She 
also pointed, inter alia, to the fact that she called home about 
an obnoxious student the week before the break and, even 
though his mother “said they told him to ‘knock it off,’” the 
first thing he did when he saw her was to mock her failed 
effort to ruin his weekend.  (Id.)  Munroe claimed in another 
blog post that a female student (described as the girl in the 
back in pink) made a cheat sheet only two days after 
Munroe’s speech about honor and integrity and one day after 
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the class signed an honor pledge.  Even the “report card 
comments” she wished to add to the “canned” comment list 
were often phrased in suspiciously specific terms. 
 
We also observe that Munroe “did not take a 
conciliatory approach” in her subsequent media appearances.  
Id. at 538.  Instead, she purportedly defended her blog entries 
and refused to apologize for the comments.  Students and 
parents were thereby presented with a teacher who expressed 
hostility and disgust against her own students and who, when 
publicly confronted with her comments, not only refused to 
apologize—but even went so far as to defend her derogatory 
statements in the local and national media. 
 
It would be an understatement to say that Munroe’s 
speech caused rather negative reactions on the part of both 
students and their parents.  Likewise, it is wrong to claim (as 
Munroe does in her appellate brief) that “the School District 
[at most] demonstrated that some township residents were 
unhappy with Munroe’s comments.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 
28.)  According to CB East’s principal, the students were 
“furious” and “livid,” and the school was “like a ticking time 
bomb.”  (A397.)  “To say it was a disruption to the learning 
environment is an understatement.”  (A398.)  Lucabaugh then 
began to receive e-mails from parents indicating that they did 
not want Munroe to teach their children, and (as the District 
Court noted) students were permitted to opt out of Munroe’s 
class.  The School District hired another person to “shadow” 
Munroe.  In other words, another educator was paid to teach 
the same exact schedule as Munroe herself.  While Munroe 
views the Defendants’ decision to inform residents in August 
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2011 that they would honor all “opt-out” requests as an 
unprecedented step meant to set her up for failure, she also 
acknowledged in her deposition testimony that the whole 
situation was probably unprecedented.  In fact, it appears 
uncontested that Lucabaugh continued to receive more and 
more e-mails from concerned parents throughout the summer 
and peaking in June and July of 2011.  “[N]ow I’m talking 
over seventy-five people, eighty people, ninety people, one 
hundred people, a hundred and—and it was growing.”  
(A399.)  When a teacher’s derogatory comments about his or 
her students cause numerous parents to tell the school district 
that they “don’t want her as my child’s teacher” (id.), it is 
appropriate to conclude that his or her speech “‘impedes the 
performance of the speaker’s duties’” as a teacher.  
Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 991 (quoting Rankin, 483 U.S. at 
388).  Such speech then “‘interferes with the regular 
operation of the enterprise’” because the school district hired 
another teacher to accommodate the sheer and unprecedented 
number of parental “opt-outs” it received.  Id. (quoting 
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388); see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-
73 (considering whether teacher’s speech “either impeded the 
teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the 
classroom” or “interfered with the regular operation of the 
schools generally” (footnote omitted)). 
 
Munroe does point out that she was allowed to return 
to work the following school year (after her paid suspension 
and maternity leave ended) and that, after then teaching for a 
full year, she was ultimately terminated—supposedly on 
account of her poor performance.  When she returned to 
work, Lucabaugh informed the media that “[n]o one here is 
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contending that she can’t say these things ... legally” and that 
“she has a legal right to return.”  (A286.)  According to 
Munroe, Defendants thereby recognized that Munroe’s right 
to free expression outweighed any disruption and accordingly 
chose not to terminate her when she returned to work in 
August 2011.  She claims that “the School District cannot 
now be heard to say that a threat of disruption to the operation 
of its schools outweighed Munroe’s rights.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief at 31.)  Munroe further contends that the District Court 
evidently determined that disruption automatically barred her 
claim, instead of treating such disruption as a factor to be 
weighed as part of what this Court in Dougherty recognized 
as a true balancing test. 
 
While Defendants’ actions here were somewhat 
unusual and further complicate an already difficult situation, 
we do not agree that they are now somehow estopped or 
barred from claiming that the actual and potential disruption 
caused by Munroe’s speech outweighed her free speech 
rights—or that such actions on their part otherwise meant that 
there was no disruption (or that the Pickering balancing test 
necessarily weighed in favor of Munroe).  After all, 
Defendants need not make out a particularly strong showing 
of disruption in this case given the weakness of Munroe’s 
interest, as well as the interest of the public, in her speech.  
See, e.g., Miller, 544 F.3d at 549 n.2.  In Dougherty, we 
acknowledged that Dougherty’s speech caused actual 
disruption to the school district, but we then highlighted the 
absurdity of allowing corrupt officials to punish their 
whistleblowing subordinates because the speech had a 
somewhat disruptive effect.  Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 992-93.  
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Munroe, unlike Dougherty, was not a whistleblower.  The 
District Court, in any event, appropriately took into account 
the competing interests and then determined that the speech at 
issue here was not protected because the disruption 
diminished any legitimate interest in its expression.  
Furthermore, the First Amendment does not require a school 
district to continue to employ a teacher who expresses the 
kind of hostility and disgust against her students that Munroe 
did on her blog and then publicly defends such comments to 
the media—which results in serious negative reactions on the 
part of both students and parents, the submission of numerous 
parental “opt-out” requests, and the hiring of an additional 
teacher.  It appears that Munroe could have been fired when 
Defendants became aware of her blog posts (although the fact 
that she was scheduled to begin her maternity leave may have 
complicated the situation) or at least at the beginning of the 
next school year.  But Defendants should not be held liable 
for violating the First Amendment simply because they 
(rather generously) hired another teacher and permitted 
Munroe to return to work or because of what was said at the 
principal’s media briefing.  As the District Court also noted, 
Lucabaugh did not explain whether his assessment was 
premised on the United States Constitution, state law, or the 
terms of Munroe’s employment contract.  In fact, C.B. East’s 
principal made it clear that Munroe’s speech caused 
disruption and harmed C.B. East’s students, explaining that 
“[w]hat is at the heart of this issue, however, is the large-scale 
disruption her comments created, and the ensuing damage 
they have caused the young men and women to whom she 
was alluding.”  (A286.)   
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In Melzer, the Second Circuit assumed that Melzer’s 
activities on behalf of NAMBLA possessed the highest value 
under the First Amendment and placed a heavy burden on the 
board of education to justify his dismissal.  Melzer, 336 F.3d 
at 198.  However, it still concluded that, given the nature of 
his position as a public school teacher, “the disruption they 
cause is great enough to warrant the school’s action against 
him.”  Id.  While some parents and students expressed 
support for his free speech rights and there were certain minor 
discrepancies with respect to the reported disruption, “[i]t is 
nonetheless entirely reasonable for the Board to believe that 
many parents and students had a strong negative reaction to 
him, and that such a reaction caused the school to suffer 
severe internal disruption.”  Id.  A psychological expert 
testified that a teacher with Melzer’s beliefs would provoke 
anxiety for the average student (e.g., he or she would be 
unable to concentrate or would be uncomfortable asking for 
help after class).  Id. at 198-99.  The Second Circuit pointed 
out that, while “[h]e acts in loco parentis for a group of 
students that includes adolescent boys,” he simultaneously 
“advocates changes in the law to accommodate his desire to 
have sexual relations with such children.”  Id. at 199.  “We 
think it is perfectly reasonable to predict that parents will fear 
his influence and predilections.  Parents so concerned may 
remove their children, thereby interrupting the children’s 
education, impairing the school’s reputation, and impairing 
educationally desirable interdependency and cooperation 
among parents, teachers, and administrators.”  Id.  In fact, 
several parents threatened to remove their children from the 
school, and Melzer candidly admitted that it would be 
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difficult for him to decide whether to report an incident of 
child molestation.11  Id. at 191, 199. 
 
Similarly, we find it significant that the Seventh 
Circuit determined that the defendants’ interests in remedying 
the potential disruption caused by a guidance counselor’s 
book of adult relationship advice outweighed his own speech 
interest.  Craig, 736 F.3d at 1119.  As the Craig court 
explained, “Defendants’ assessment of how Craig’s students, 
and particularly his female students, would respond upon 
reading or hearing about the hypersexualized content looms 
large in our analysis.”  Id.  For instance, female students 
could easily feel uncomfortable asking for his advice given 
                                                 
11 According to the Second Circuit, “the employee may 
still carry the day [even if the government prevails in the 
balancing test] if he can show that the employer’s motivation 
for the discipline was retaliation for the speech itself, rather 
than for any resulting disruption.’”  Melzer, 336 F.3d at 193 
(citing Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 
1996)).  The Second Circuit found no proof that the board of 
education’s decision to terminate Melzer was motivated by 
his NAMBLA membership (which was known to the board 
for a number of years).  Id. at 199-200.  Unlike Melzer, 
Munroe has not raised this issue before either the District 
Court or this Court.  In fact, Munroe failed to address the 
Melzer opinion in her District Court briefing, even though 
Defendants addressed it in their own briefs.  She likewise 
fails to mention this opinion in her appellate briefing 
(although it was cited by the District Court, and Defendants 
rely on the Second Circuit’s ruling in their appellate brief).       
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“his professed inability to refrain from sexualizing females.”  
Id. at 1120.  Likewise, some students could be apprehensive 
about speaking with Craig on account of his derogative view 
of women.  Id.  He specifically claimed in his book—which, 
after all, was entitled “It’s Her Fault”—that women do not 
succeed in relationships because of their tendency to act 
based only on their emotions and emphasized “the importance 
of a woman’s sexual ‘submissiveness’ to her male partner.”  
Id.  The Seventh Circuit understandably asked whether a 
female high school student would really speak with a 
guidance counselor about future career options knowing he 
believed women are not inclined to rational thought or go to 
him to discuss relationship issues given his views about 
sexual submissiveness.12  Id. 
 
 Obviously, Munroe does not support sexual relations 
with minors, and she likewise did not publish a book 
confessing to her inability to refrain from sexualizing her 
students.  However, she still expressed hostility and disgust 
                                                 
12 Defendants and the District Court have also cited to 
a 1981 ruling by the Sixth Circuit.  In Anderson v. Evans, 660 
F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1981), the panel majority concluded that 
the defendants did not violate the First Amendment when 
they terminated an elementary school teacher who made 
racially charged remarks that, inter alia, had a detrimental 
effect on the school and the community it served, id. at 159.  
In short, “the interest of the school board in maintaining an 
efficient and regularly functioning school system and in 
employing effective teachers outweighed Mrs. Anderson’s 
interest in making the remarks.”  Id. 
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against her own students.  “Is it unreasonable to think a [CB 
East student] who learned that[, to give just one example, 
Munroe referred to her students as ‘the devil’s spawn’ 
(A237)] may decide against” asking her advice?  Id.  
Likewise, how could students be expected to participate in a 
class when a teacher indicated that she wished she could use 
terms like “Rat-like” on their own report cards (even if her 
list was intended as a humorous exercise)?  (A245.)  
Accordingly, we determine that, pursuant to the Pickering 
balancing test, Munroe’s speech did not constitute speech 
protected by the First Amendment. 
 
III. 
 
 We will affirm the order of the District Court granting 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 
1 
 
Natalie Munroe v. Central Bucks School District, et al. 
No.  14-3509 
_________________________________________________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
My colleagues focus on Ms. Munroe’s claim that she 
was retaliated against for authoring offensive blog posts.  
This is an issue that is closer than they suggest.  However, I 
need not deal with it, as there is more to Munroe’s lawsuit 
than blog posts to friends that became public.  A critical 
component is the allegation that the TV and print interviews 
Munroe gave following her suspension by the School District 
factored into its discharge decision 15 months later.  
Unexplainably, the District Court declined to address this 
argument, saying only in a footnote that, even if it had 
considered the interviews, that wouldn’t have changed its 
decision to enter summary judgment.  See Munroe v. Cent. 
Bucks Sch. Dist., 34 F. Supp. 3d 532, 538 n.65 (E.D. Pa. 
2014).  That is not very satisfying.  If Munroe had a First 
Amendment right to say her piece before a national audience, 
and no doubt she did (even the School District acknowledged 
this), then summary judgment is inappropriate to the extent 
her TV appearances, coupled with her comments made to 
print media, played a role in her dismissal and the School 
District wouldn’t have taken the same action absent them.  
See Miller v. Clinton Cnty., 544 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2008).       
Like the District Court, my colleagues duck this 
argument.  Their out, however, is that Munroe didn’t 
“devote[] much attention to the subsequent media coverage,” 
Maj. Op. 35 n.7, and provided “essentially no evidence 
regarding the content of the[] interviews besides [her] general 
characterization of them,” id. at 34–35.  Because I do not 
share that assessment and would reverse to allow a jury to 
consider whether Munroe’s interviews with the media 
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contributed to the allegedly retaliatory dismissal, I 
respectfully dissent.         
The first order of business is to determine whether 
Munroe adequately preserved the claim that she was 
retaliated against for discussing her suspension with various 
news organizations.  Parting ways with the conclusion of my 
colleagues, see Maj. Op. 35 n.7, I think the answer is a 
resounding yes.  Though Munroe may not have made the 
claim the focus of her case, she certainly raised it at every 
stage in the District Court and again on appeal.  In her 
complaint, she alleges that the School District punished her 
for appearing on “CBS, ABC, NBC, CNN, Fox News” and 
giving interviews to, among others, “Time Magazine, 
Reuters, the Associated Press, [and] the Philadelphia 
Inquirer,” and that all these appearances “were protected 
under the First Amendment.”  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–29.  
Likewise, her response to the School District’s summary-
judgment motion argues that she “engaged in two types of 
speech, each of which [is] protected under the First 
Amendment[:] First, [she] blogged to her friends and family 
about her experiences at CB East . . . . [;] [and] [s]econd, 
[she] engaged the media in a very public debate about her 
blog and the Education Debate discussed in [it].”  Pl.’s Opp’n 
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 15–16.  And the District Court 
apparently thought enough of the argument to address it 
(though only in a footnote), positing that “the analysis would 
not change . . . upon consideration of the interviews [Munroe] 
gave to the media.”  Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 538 n.65.     
Finally, on appeal in the section of her brief titled 
“Statement of the Issue Presented for Review,” Munroe poses 
the following question: “Did the District Court err in holding 
that a public school teacher’s opinions about matters of public 
concern, published in her blog and stated in interviews to 
various media outlets, were unworthy of First 
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Amendment . . . protection under the Pickering v. Board of 
Education [391 U.S. 563 (1968)] balancing test?”  Munroe 
Br. 1 (emphasis added).  She also addresses the claim in the 
section of her brief titled “Rulings Presented for Review,” 
Munroe Br. 14, and develops her argument in later sections, 
see id. at 26 (asserting that her media appearances implicated 
a matter of public concern), id. at 28 (pointing out that “there 
was no evidence offered to demonstrate that [her] blog 
entries, or her interviews with the media, prevented her from 
doing her job as a high school English teacher” (emphasis 
added)).  Even the School District deems Munroe’s argument 
about the media interviews important enough to address.  It 
contends that the interviews shouldn’t receive First 
Amendment protection and, in any event, “there is no genuine 
issue of any material fact that Plaintiff would have been 
terminated even in the absence of her blog and media tour.”  
School Dist. Br. 51 (emphasis added).  In this context, 
Munroe has adequately raised, both before the District Court 
and on appeal, whether her media interviews were a reason 
for the retaliation she alleges.  I thus move to the merits.      
To succeed on her claim, Munroe must establish that 
the interviews were “protected by the First Amendment 
and . . . [were] a substantial or motivating factor” in the 
allegedly retaliatory discharge.  Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Miller, 544 
F.3d at 548.  If she succeeds, the burden shifts back to the 
School District to show it would have fired her regardless 
whether she had told her story before a national audience.  
The First Amendment question—which, per Pickering, 
balances “the interest in freedom of expression against the 
employer’s interests[—]is to be done by the judge, not the 
jury.”  Dishnow v. Sch. Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194, 198 
(7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J).  The causation issues, by contrast, 
the jury decides.  See Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886, 
892 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995).         
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The threshold issue in determining if Munroe’s speech 
was protected by the First Amendment is whether her 
interviews with the national media implicated a matter of 
public concern.  See Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 
736 F.3d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 2013).  If she can show this, 
the School District’s interest in promoting an “effective and 
efficient” learning environment is balanced against Munroe’s 
interest in commenting on her suspension.  Id. at 1118 
(quoting Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 714 (7th Cir. 
2009) (internal quotations marks omitted)).  The outcome of 
that test, called Pickering balancing, yields the answer to 
whether the First Amendment protects Munroe’s TV 
appearances and print interviews.   
On the public-concern question, I see no difficulty (nor 
apparently do my colleagues, see Maj. Op. 34–35) in 
concluding that Munroe’s TV appearances involved a matter 
of “legitimate news interest,” San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 
84 (2004) (per curiam), or a matter “in which the public 
might be interested,” Dishnow, 77 F.3d at 197.  See also 
Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(Posner, J.) (“The First Amendment protects entertainment as 
well as treatises on politics and public administration.”).  The 
relevant sequence of events is instructive.   
After the public learned of Munroe’s blog, Central 
Bucks High School East (“CB East”) Principal Abram 
Lucabaugh moved swiftly to suspend her and issued a 
televised statement explaining the School District’s decision 
to do so.  Caught off guard by the public announcement, 
Munroe “felt . . . it was necessary to share [her] side of the 
story.”  Munroe Dep. Tr. 58:5–12.  Luckily for her, the 
suspension became a national news story, and when it did a 
number of highly prominent news programs invited her to 
discuss the situation on live TV.  Among them were ABC’s 
Good Morning America and Fox News’s Fox and Friends 
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and Justice with Jeanine.  Time Magazine and The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, among others, likewise wanted the 
scoop.  While Munroe maintains she focused on whether 
“today’s youth is overindulged, underworked, and self-
entitled” and whether “their parents and schools have been 
complicit in creating this result,” Pl.’s Reply Mem. Law Opp. 
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3, the School District argues otherwise.  
It contends that Munroe used the interviews to defend herself, 
not to engage in a public debate.  The likely answer is a 
combination of both, but the key is that Munroe’s media tour 
focused on an event that had already captured the public’s 
attention: the suspension of a public school teacher for 
criticizing her students on a publicly available blog.  As one 
prominent publication put it, Munroe found “herself in the 
middle of a swirling online debate—not over what she did, 
but over what she said about the sometimes harsh realities of 
the 21st century classroom.”  Kayla Webley, How One 
Teacher’s Angry Blog Sparked a Viral Classroom Debate, 
TIME (Feb. 18, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/printout/ 
0,8816,2052123,00.html.  Munroe’s intimate familiarity with 
the facts made her account all the more newsworthy.  Viewed 
in that light, Munroe’s failure to introduce in court a play-by-
play of her media appearances is of no consequence.     
Having concluded that Munroe’s media tour 
implicated a matter of public concern, I turn to the Pickering 
balancing portion of the analysis.  On that front, to repeat, a 
court must “balance the employee’s interest in engaging in 
her speech with the employer’s countervailing interests.”  
Miller, 544 F.3d at 548.  In the school context, those interests 
include a teacher’s ability to fulfill her duties in the 
classroom.  See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ. Dist. of City of N.Y., 
336 F.3d 185, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2003).  “[T]he amount of 
disruption a public employer has to tolerate is directly 
proportional to the importance of the disputed speech.”  
Miller, 544 F.3d at 549 n.2.; see also Dishnow, 77 F.3d at 197 
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(noting that the public employer must show that it “had a 
convincing reason to forbid the speech” in question).  Though 
the School District argues that its “interest in curtailing 
speech that affected [CB East]’s operation [is] great,” School 
Dist. Br. 40, it has pointed to nothing suggesting that 
Munroe’s appearances in the national media (as distinct from 
her blog) interfered with her ability to educate her students.  
Nor has it argued that Munroe’s decision to tell her side of a 
story that spawned a spirited public debate negatively 
affected employee morale.  My colleagues have no answer 
and say only that the First Amendment doesn’t require a 
school district to continue employing a teacher “who, when 
publicly confronted with her comments, not only refused to 
apologize—but even went so far as to defend her derogatory 
statements in the local and national media.”  Maj. Op. 50.       
The most that can be said of these arguments is that 
Munroe didn’t “take a conciliatory approach” when 
interviewed and “fanned the flames of controversy.”  Munroe, 
34 F. Supp. 3d at 538.  But, even if true, it says nothing about 
whether this made the job of running CB East more difficult.  
Furthermore, it is hard to take seriously the School District’s 
disruption argument when it did virtually nothing to quell the 
disorder that supposedly prevented CB East from satisfying 
its educational mission.  After Munroe’s blog became public 
and the ensuing firestorm of publicity, the School District 
could presumably have asserted that its educational 
obligations outweighed Munroe’s free-speech rights and 
discharged her.  But it opted instead to suspend her, which 
was of minimal import to Munroe, as this coincided with her 
planned maternity leave.  The School District had a second 
opportunity to dismiss (or, at the very least, transfer) Munroe 
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when, after her suspension was lifted,1 CB East students 
opted out of her class en masse in August 2011.  But again 
the School District didn’t do so.  The result, in my view, is 
that the School District forfeited its right to match its 
operational interests against Munroe’s free speech interests.   
For these reasons, I see no path to conclude that the 
Pickering balance weighs in the School District’s favor.                    
That takes me to the final two questions, both of which 
deal with causation.  First, were Munroe’s interviews a 
motivating factor in the School District’s discharge decision?  
See Watters, 55 F.3d at 892 (noting that, to succeed on a 
retaliation claim, a “plaintiff must show that the protected 
activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged 
retaliatory action”).  If they were, has the School District 
carried its burden to show that it would have reached the 
same decision regardless of the interviews?  See id.  
Precedent counsels us to tread carefully when deciding issues 
of causation on summary judgment—all the more so here.        
That School District officials were upset about 
Munroe’s media tour is made plain by two “smoking-gun” 
emails.  After seeing Munroe appear on Fox News, a School 
District director, John Gamble, told his colleagues he was 
“confident [the Board] [was] doing the right thing.”  To 
remove any doubt about what “doing the right thing” refers 
to, we need only look at the bottom of Gamble’s email, which 
makes clear it was sent in response to the “termination plan” 
Superintendent N. Robert Laws had circulated.  At the end of 
that email, Laws too revealed how he felt about Munroe’s 
                                              
1  Principal Lucabaugh announced that Munroe had a “legal 
right” to blog about her students and a “right to return” to CB 
East.  He also indicated that a transfer “would be both 
irresponsible and further disruptive.”   
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media tour, see id. (“I will not be drug [sic] into the mud of 
TV news entertainment . . . .”), and that “Fox news ha[d] 
called [him] 6 times . . . to appear on the Justice with Jeannie 
[sic] show,” id.   
Against this background, I am persuaded that Munroe 
has, at a minimum, created a jury question about whether her 
media interviews factored into the discharge decision.  
Nothing the School District has argued convinces me 
otherwise, i.e., that the causal connection “question is so free 
from doubt as to justify taking it from the jury.”  Revels v. 
Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Naucke 
v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2002)).  
Despite its best attempt to shine a light on Munroe’s 
purported poor performance as the reason for her firing, the 
School District’s argument is unpersuasive if not 
disingenuous.  A brief reiteration of Munroe’s employment 
history at CB East is in order.   
After being hired to teach English in 2006, Munroe 
was awarded tenure only four years later in March 2010, on 
the recommendation of Principal Lucabaugh (who also wrote 
of Munroe in June 2008 that “[s]he is a consummate educator 
with a sparkling future”).  During that time, her teaching 
record was pristine—she received the highest mark available 
(“satisfactory”) in eight consecutive performance evaluations.  
But then, on June 15, 2011—only a few months after her blog 
became known and she appeared on the media to defend her 
position in response to Lucabaugh’s televised 
announcement—Munroe received her first unsatisfactory 
evaluation.  Among the concerns noted was Munroe’s sudden 
“inability to connect to . . . students and make them feel that 
she cares about them” as well as the “overuse of vocabulary 
assignments and vocabulary assessments” and “inappropriate 
use of a ‘nanny cam’ during teaching hours.”  Munroe’s 
troubles carried over to the next semester when school 
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officials began dropping into her classes unannounced.  The 
drop-ins, according to Munroe, became “calculated and 
unrelenting,” which led to her bosses “nitpicking everything 
[] [she] did.”  Could anyone blame Munroe for believing they 
“had an agenda”?   
Seven unannounced observations later, Munroe 
received her second unsatisfactory evaluation on January 20, 
2012.  Not unexpectedly, she received a third and final 
unsatisfactory evaluation on June 1, which highlighted her 
continued performance issues and failure to submit lesson 
plans using the “Central Bucks School District designed 
template”—the latter a requirement to which she was never 
held until she began receiving unsatisfactory evaluations.  
Termination inevitably followed in June 2012.     
In short, I have no doubt the School District was well 
aware that firing Munroe for her blog posts and media tour 
would land it in constitutional hot water.  More than enough 
evidence suggests that firing her on performance grounds was 
a pretext for its real reason—she had spoken out to friends on 
a blog, it became public, School District officials were upset 
and proposed her termination, they decided to wait, the once-
sterling evaluations of Munroe immediately became negative, 
and she was fired.  The bottom line: too many signs suggest 
this was all a set-up that a jury needs to sort out.  I thus 
respectfully dissent.    
